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Abstract 
Market based implementation of monetary policy embeds a swift and complete pass-through of changes in policy rate 
to market interest rates. This impacts the lending and deposit rates (retail rates) of the banking system. Incomplete and 
slow pass-through impairs the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission mechanism.  This study estimates the 
degree and the speed of interest rate pass-through in case of Pakistan.  Monthly data on State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) 
policy rate, money market rates and banks‟ retail lending/deposit rates from July 2001 to August 2011 is used to 
estimate an unrestricted autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model.  The standard ARDL model allows for the 
estimation of an error correction model, which helps in differentiating short run impact of changes in policy rate from its 
long run impact on the banks‟ lending rates.  The results indicate that while there is a swift pass-through from the 
policy rate (T-bill rates and overnight rate) to money market rate, the impact of changes in money market rates on the 
bank deposit rates is not only sluggish, but also incomplete.  However, banks‟ lending rates on fresh loans are more 
responsive to changes in money market rates as the banks have the luxury to take into account the changes in 
opportunity cost of funding.   
 
1 Introduction 
Despite active monetary management by the State Bank of Pakistan (the central bank), the economy continued to 
witness double-digit inflation in recent years (average annual inflation during FY08 to FY11 stood at 14.6 percent). A 
quick review of recent monetary policy statements suggests that massive government borrowing from the central bank; 
swift pass-through of changes in international commodity prices to domestic consumers; upward adjustments in 
administered prices; and supply side disturbances, diluted the impact of monetary management on ultimate targets.  
While these factors have definitely contributed to high inflation in recent years, the effectiveness of monetary policy is 
also questioned as persistently high inflation is difficult to be explained by the supply side factors alone.  Thus, it is 
imperative to investigate the effectiveness of monetary policy at least to the extent of impacting money market rates 
and banks‟ lending/deposit rates, which is a key link in transmission mechanism of monetary policy.   
 
Prolific literature on monetary policy reveals that banking system is not a „neutral conveyor‟ of changes in monetary 
policy to the economy (Bernanke and Blinder [1988)]; Bernanke and Gertler [1989]; Bernanke [1993]).  For example, 
an increase in monetary policy rate by the central bank may fail to contain excess demand in the economy if the banks 
do not adjust their retail rates.  This stickiness of banks‟ retail rates could be attributed to a variety of factors including 
structure and development level of the financial sector; efficiency of financial markets; degree of competition; funding 
structure of corporate and household sectors; and access to international resources.  These market imperfections are 
of great importance for developing countries as their financial sectors are generally bank dominated and corporate 
sector primarily depend upon banking system for their long term as well as running finance requirements (Cottarelli 
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and Kourelis [1994]). This is particularly true in case of Pakistan.  The corporate sector borrowed 78.6 percent of their 
external funding from the banking system as of end 2010.  Moreover, Agha et al (2005) also found that banking system 
plays a key role in transmitting changes in monetary policy to aggregate demand through its lending to the private 
sector.  
 
As a result of continued financial sector reforms and restructuring, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has shifted its 
focus away from traditional measures of monetary management towards the market-oriented instruments.  The efforts 
have also been made to separate the government debt management from SBP‟s monetary management as the 
decision to determine cut-off rate in Treasury Bills auctions is shifted from SBP to the government debt management 
office (Ministry of Finance).  Moreover, the role of SBP policy rate has been strengthened to signal changes in the 
monetary policy stance by implementing a new framework of interest rate corridor for liquidity management. The recent 
changes in monetary policy framework of SBP are an indication of strengthening interest rate channel of MTM and in 
line with the best practices followed by the central banks in advanced countries.  Specifically, Goodfriend (1991) noted 
that official rate is an important lever for central banks that operates through short term rates and have greater 
influence on aggregate demand in the economy. 
 
Given the bank-dominated financial sector of Pakistan, the effectiveness of monetary policy critically depends on the 
pass-through of changes in policy interest rates to banks‟ lending and deposit rates. It implies that effective monetary 
management requires credible information on the degree and speed of interest rate pass-through.  This would facilitate 
SBP‟s decision regarding (magnitude of) change in policy rate to achieve desired impact on bank‟s retail rates.   
The objectives of this study are:  (a) to measure the degree and the speed of pass-through of SBP policy rate to banks‟ 
retail lending and deposit rates; (b) to explore the possibility of asymmetric pass-through for upward and downward 
movement in policy rate to bank‟s lending and deposit rates; and (c) to identify weak links in pass-through mechanism. 
 
The scope of this study is confined to analyze the impact of changes in SBP policy rate on money market rates and 
retail lending and deposit rates of the banks in Pakistan.  This is popularly known as interest rate channel of monetary 
policy transmission mechanism.  In the context of effectiveness of the monetary policy, it is beyond the scope of the 
study to estimate impact on the amount of the credit to the private sector, and on the inflation being the ultimate 
indicator of the effectiveness of the monetary policy. 
 
Given the background, problem of statement, objectives and scope of study in this section, the rest of the study is 
organized in seven sections.  Section 2 provides preliminary review of literature and highlights the contribution of this 
study to existing literature.  This discussion is followed by brief review of SBP monetary policy framework in Section 3.  
While theoretical links among key interest rates are explained in section 4, section 5 describes data and its descriptive 
statistics.  Section 6 discusses methodology used in this study.  Discussion on results and asymmetric interest rate 
pass-through is the subject of Section 7.  Final section is for concluding remarks and policy implications.   
 
2 Review of Literature  
Literature on the effectiveness of monetary policy suggests that there is a consensus among economists that monetary 
policy has strong impact on inflation, while it has a transitory impact - in short run - on economic activities.  However, 
the consensus is based on an assumption that there is a strong and stable relationship between instruments and the 
ultimate targets of monetary policy through the monetary transmission mechanism (MTM).  Moreover, literature on 
MTM implicitly assumes an instantaneous and complete pass-through of changes in monetary policy instruments to 
the money market rates and then to the retail rates of banking system (Bernanke and Gertler [1995]; Bernanke and 
Gilchrist [1999]).   
 
Most of the literature exploring relationship among the instruments and ultimate goal of monetary policy is largely 
confined to measuring stability of demand for money.  This strand of literature largely discards implications of the 
incomplete and sluggish pass-through of interest rate changes on retail rates of banks in spite of strong theoretical 
reasoning provided by Bernanke and Blinder [1988)]; Bernanke and Gertler [1989]; and Bernanke [1993]. Cottarelli 
and Kourelis [1994] were the first to explicitly focus on this issue.  They explored the link between financial structure 
and stickiness of banks‟ retail lending rates.  They used monthly data on lending rate, money market rates and 
discount rates of 31 countries and based their empirical analysis on ARDL modeling. Their results indicated that 
degree of stickiness was substantially different across countries in the short run.  However, the long run multiplier of 
lending rates, on average, turned out to be 97 bps in response to 100 bps change in market rates. 
 
Another important paper on the response of short term bank lending rates to policy rate was contributed by Borio and 
Fritz (1995).  The authors provided conceptual framework by relating the notions of opportunity and marginal cost of 
funding to banks‟ loan rates, and explicitly recognized the problem of asymmetric nature of interest rate pass-through.  
A loan rate response function for 12 OECD countries was estimated by using monthly data on key interest rates from 
January 1984 to July 1994.  In their study, policy rate was found to be an important determinant of loan rates both in 
the short and long run.  Their results also indicated that long run responses of lending rate ranged between 80 bps 110 
bps.  Cross country differences also came out quite significantly as the short run responses of loan rate and their 
pattern of adjustments were different considerably.  As for asymmetric nature of loan rate responses was concerned, 
the authors could not reject the null hypotheses of symmetric responses of loan rate for most of the countries over the 
period of analysis.   
 
Mojon (2000) explored the possibility of different degrees of interest rate pass-through among the 5 economies of 
European Monetary Union namely; Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Spain.  The results suggested that 
„interest rate cycle asymmetry of pass-through‟ receded with competition in the banking industry.  Response of retail 
rate to the changes in policy rate was found to be sluggish.  Moreover, pass-through was relatively swift in case of 
short term interest rates compared to the long term, and there was evidence in favour of asymmetric nature of interest 
rate pass-through in these countries.  Bondt (2002) also confirmed the findings of Mojon (2000).   
 
Tieman (2004) analyzed the impact of changes in the policy rate on the money market rates by using monthly data 
from January 1995 to February 2004 and by employing ECM.  The author found that pass-through of policy rate to 
money market rate in Romania was consistent with other transition economies in the region.  The study also showed 
that pass-through of policy rate to new bank loans was almost one-to-one, and strengthened over time.   
 
Sanusi (2010) estimated the degree of pass-through from changes in Central Bank of Nigeria‟s official policy rate to 
the money market and banks‟ retail rates by using SVAR techniques and monthly data from January 2002 to April 
2010.  The most important findings of the paper was that the pass-through effect of monetary policy rate on the retail 
lending and deposits rates actually declined following the implementation of financial sector reforms in 2005.   
 
2.1   Studies on Pakistan  
Given the role of country specific financial sector developments in determining the speed and degree of interest rate 
pass-through, the issue has been the subject of - at least - three studies in our knowledge. Qayyum et al (2005) was 
the first to take up this issue and estimated a transfer function by using monthly data on key interest rates from March 
1991 to December 2004.  Their results indicated that pass-through from T-bill rate to call money rate is almost one-to-
one and completed during a month.  However, pass-through to weighted average lending rate (WALR) and weighted 
average deposit rate (WADR) was found to be low.   
 
State Bank of Pakistan (2005) provided empirical evidence on transmission mechanism of change in 6-month T-bill 
cut-off rate to WALR and WADR of the banking system by estimating an ARDL model upon monthly data from July 
1999 to June 2006.  The results indicated that short run pass-through is very low as 100 bps increase in T-bills rates 
lead to only 20 bps rise in WALR during the first month.  However, long run coefficient was found to be close to one 
and it took 5 months to complete the process. Compared to WALR, the pass-through was found to be incomplete in 
case of WADR as the long run coefficient was 44 bps only.   
 
Khawaja and Khan (2008) also estimated a transfer function by using monthly data from September 2001 to February 
2009.  Their study focused on KIBOR compared to call money rate in Qayyum et al (2005).  They found that a 100 bps 
increase in T-bills rate lead to 87 bps rise in KIBOR, 43 bps in WALR and only 16 bps for WADR during a month.  
  
While papers discussed are important contributions to the literature on interest rate pass-through in case of Pakistan, 
this study extends the earlier work in four aspects.  First, it explicitly takes up the issue of asymmetric interest rate 
pass-through of changes in the policy, which none of the earlier studies on Pakistan considered.  Second, in this study 
we make use of different tenors of KIBOR, which allows us to identify existing rigidities in the market rates as well.  
The earlier studies on Pakistan were confined to analyze the role of interest rate only.  Third, we use weighted average 
lending rate on both fresh and outstanding loans to segregate the impact of change in policy rate on new loan 
contracts and the old ones.  The same bifurcation is also maintained in case of bank deposits.  And, finally the study 
incorporates a section on monetary policy framework to explain major changes over the period of estimation.  Keeping 
these changes in mind, we take into account the weighted average overnight rate as the SBP uses an implicit and/or 
explicit interest rates corridor since July 2005.   
 
3 Monetary Policy Framework in Pakistan 
In line with the developments taking place at international front, the monetary policy framework of SBP has witnessed 
substantial changes.  The monetarist view that monetary policy is a prime source of the business cycle, and a constant 
monetary growth rule can be followed in a bid to smooth out fluctuations in output growth, dominated the monetary 
policy framework of SBP till late 1990s.  A key assumption of monetarism that there exists a stable relation between 
monetary aggregates and inflation was tested by a number of researchers in case of Pakistan. We had evidence of 
stable money demand function in studies for Pakistan using data up to late 1990s [Sassanpour and Moinuddin (1993), 
Khan (1994), Khan et al (2000)].  In these settings, SBP had been targeting broad money supply (M2) growth within a 
desirable limit - determined on the basis of an estimated money demand function, considering government‟s economic 
growth and inflation targets for the year. For targeting inflation, M2 was used as an intermediate target and M0 had 
been used as an operational target.  SBP followed reserve money program to estimate the desired size of open market 
operations.  However, structural changes both in the economy and financial market, financial innovations and 
technological advancements significantly weakened the relation between inflation and broad money supply (Moinuddin 
[2007], Hanif et al [2010]).  
 
Pakistan has slowly moved from monetary aggregate targeting to an eclectic approach. National Credit Consultative 
Council has been restructured into a Private Credit Advisory Committee (PCAC) and rather than announcing the 
detailed credit plan for a year, SBP started giving just an „indicative‟ M2 target based upon government announced 
growth and inflation targets and assessing the trends of net domestic assets (NDA) and net foreign assets (NFA).  
Exchange rate is now market driven. SBP has been pursuing the goal of price stability without being prejudice to 
economic growth.  For some years when M2 growth was used an indicative target, it served as intermediate target, 
however, SBP has abandoned to target M2 growth since FY10.  Furthermore, the operational target has been 
transformed from reserve money to the overnight (as it is generally recognized that central banks can better control the 
very short end of the yield curve) money market repo rate (with the movement of the overnight money market repo rate 
restricted within the corridor of SBP‟s overnight reverse repo rate as the ceiling and SBP overnight repo rate as the 
floor - the gap between the ceiling and floor is currently 300 bps) effective from August 2009. The movement of 
overnight money market repo rate is restricted within the „corridor‟ by conducting open market operations (OMOs) for 
liquidity management.  Monetary policy stance is signaled through change(s) in discount rate. The role of cash reserve 
requirements and statutory liquid ratio has been minimized.  
 
A variety of economic and monetary indicators are used to obtain information on how and when SBP may need to 
adjust the policy stance in order to get closer to achieve the ultimate goal of price stability without being prejudice to 
economic growth. These indicators include yield curve, weighted average lending/deposit rates, various measures of 
core inflation, and (some proxy of) output gap. Information on broad money and the reserve money is also used in 
addition to their disaggregated levels like NDA and NFA.  The underlying factors responsible for changes in NDA and 
NFA are also minutely analyzed.  Monetary policy is announced by SBP on every two months. In addition to time to 
time release of relevant data on its website, a detailed information set used to guide the policy decision is also 
released twice a year to public. 
 
4 Theoretical links among the Key Interest Rates 
Commercial banks are to maximize their profits.  In this process, lending rate is primarily determined by the opportunity 
cost of extending loans.  One of the most widely used indicators of opportunity cost is the money market rate (Borio 
and Fritz, 1995).  In practice, the banks generally have the opportunity to place their funds in the money market 
instead of extending loans to businesses. At the same time, money market rate also represents the marginal cost of 
funding for the banks as a bank can borrow from the money market at margin for onward lending.  It may be noted that 
money market rate is beyond the control of a specific bank as a single bank is generally a price taker in the money 
market.   
 
The policy rate is a key indicator of monetary policy stance and significantly impacts the spectrum of interest rates in 
the economy.  It also represents the opportunity cost of funding for banks.  In general, banks are allowed to secure 
funding at policy rate from the central bank in case of liquidity shortages. In these setting, Borio and Fritz (1995) 
argued that profit maximizing conditions require that banks‟ lending rates must reflect the changes in opportunity cost 
of funding.  Specifically, in a perfectly competitive environment there should be one-to-one relationship between 
lending rate and opportunity cost of funding if credit risk premium is held constant.   
 
4.1   Asymmetric and Sluggish Response of Lending Rate 
In simple terms, asymmetric implies that lending and deposit rates‟ response differs with respect to increase and 
decrease in the policy rate, while stickiness (or sluggish response) means that change in banks‟ retail rate is less than 
that of the policy or money market rates.  It is generally observed that stickiness in deposit rates limits the response of 
lending rates to changes in money market rates.  Other factors that limit the pass-through of changes in money market 
to lending rates include level of competition in the banking sector, efficiency of money market and operating cost of 
banks (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994).  
 
As for asymmetric impact of changes in market rates on 
lending rate is concerned, there are several factors which 
affect the degree of response in decreasing and increasing 
interest rate environment.  The most important one is 
composition of loan contracts offered by banks.  If loan 
rates are fixed over the medium to long term, banks will be 
taking the hit of foregone income due to inability of reprising 
loans at higher rate in an increasing interest rate scenario.  
This may lead to relatively swift increase in lending rates on 
the new loans.  Besides this, the demand for banks loans 
may also change in response to developments taking place 
in the economy. It is generally observed that elasticity of 
bank loans to lending rate declines during the recession and opposite is the case when economic activities are 
booming (Borio and Fritz, 1995).  
 
5  Descriptive Statistics of key Variables 
In this study we use monthly time series data on the policy rate, KIBOR of different tenors, weighted average lending 
rate, and weighted average deposit rate of the banking system from July 2001 to August 2011 (Table 1).  Before 
rigorous analysis based upon econometric exercise, it is instructive to look at descriptive statistics of key variables for 
the analysis.   
 
5.1   Lending Rate 
While analyzing pass-through of policy rate to retail lending rates, an important issue is the choice of specific lending 
rate.  We have to resort to some sort of representative lending rate for the banking system.  In case of Pakistan, we 
have the opportunity to use two types of weighted average lending rates (LR), i.e., LR based on outstanding amount of 
(stock of) loans, and the loans disbursed during the month. Descriptive statistics of both marginal and outstanding 
Table 1: Description of Key Variables 
Name Description 
PR SBP Policy Rate 
TBCO Six-month T-Bill Cut off Rate 
ONR Weighted Average Overnight Repo Rate 
LRO Weighted Average Lending Rate-Outstanding 
LRM Weighted Average Lending Rate-Marginal 
DRO Weighted Average Deposit Rate-Outstanding 
DRM Weighted Average Deposit Rate-Marginal 
K1W One-week Karachi Interbank Offered Rate 
K1M One-month Karachi Interbank Offered Rate 
K3M Three-month Karachi Interbank Offered Rate 
K6M Six-month Karachi Interbank Offered Rate 
lending rates indicate that marginal lending rates (LRM) relatively exhibit more fluctuations compared to lending rates 
on outstanding loans (LRO).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2   Deposit Rates 
Like lending rates, we 
have two types of 
average deposit rates, 
i.e., weighted average 
deposit rate based on 
fresh deposits (DRM) 
mobilized during the 
month and the 
weighted average rate paid on outstanding deposits (DRO).  Descriptive statistics in Table 2 suggest that returns on 
fresh deposits appear to be more responsive compared to average rates on outstanding deposits. Both the range and 
standard deviation of fresh deposits are larger than the corresponding statistics for outstanding deposits.   
 
5.3   Policy Rate  
SBP sets its overnight reverse repo rate (also known as discount rate) at which banks can borrow funds from the 
central bank.   Another important proxy for the policy rate is the weighted average overnight rate (WAONR).   
 
Another important interest rate, which is widely confused with the SBP policy rate, is the cut-off T-bills rate (Figure 1).  
Trends in various interest rates reveal that confusion was not entirely misplaced.  Specifically, the spread between the 
weighted average lending rates on fresh loans (WALRM) and the policy rate remained negative from July 2003 to July 
2005 (Figure 2).  Persistence of negative spread for almost two years reveals that the policy rate was made ineffective 
during that period by not moving it and focusing on cut-off T-bill rate as monetary policy signal of SBP.  Perhaps this is 
the reason that all three earlier studies (Qayyum et al [2005]; State Bank of Pakistan [2005]; Khawaja and Khan 
[2008]) measuring pass-through of interest rates used 6-month T-bill rate as the exogenous variables in their models. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Key Interest Rates 
  Lending Rates 
 
Deposit Rates 
 
Market Rate-KIBOR 
 
Proxies for Policy Rate 
  LRM LRO  DRM DRO 
 
K1W K1M K3M K6M   PR TBCO ONR 
Mean 10.8 11.5 
 
5.0 4.4 
 
8.6 8.7 8.9 9.1 
 
10.3 8.5 9.3 
Median 11.0 11.3 
 
5.0 4.2 
 
9.5 9.4 9.7 10.0 
 
9.0 8.8 9.1 
Maximum 15.5 14.7 
 
9.5 7.0 
 
14.0 14.3 15.5 15.7 
 
15.0 14.0 13.7 
Minimum 4.6 6.4 
 
1.2 1.2 
 
1.5 1.3 1.4 1.6 
 
7.5 1.3 1.4 
Range 10.9 8.2 
 
8.3 5.8 
 
12.5 13.0 14.1 14.1 
 
7.5 12.7 12.3 
Std. Dev. 3.1 2.3 
 
2.2 1.8 
 
3.8 3.9 4.0 3.9 
 
2.5 3.9 3.0 
Obs. 122 86 
 
122 86 
 
120 120 120 120 
 
122 122 86 
   
 
 
Keeping all these issues in mind, all three rates namely the SBP Policy rate, WAONR, and 6-month T-bill cut-off rate, 
are used to analyze their impact on the retail rates of the banking system.   
 
5.4   Money Market Rate 
The importance of money market rates in the monetary transmission mechanism can hardly be over emphasized as: 
(a) changes in policy directly influence the money market rate; and (b) these rates are an important determinant of cost 
of marginal funding for the scheduled banks.   
 
Although all the money market rates follow similar pattern, the choice of specific rate may influence the overall findings 
as the volatility of different tenors‟ money market rates sometimes differ considerably.  Being cognizant of this issue, 
we use KIBOR of four different tenors ranging from one week to 6 months.  Descriptive statistics in Table 1 reveal that 
short term KIBOR (one week and one month) exhibits slightly lower volatility than the medium term tenors KIBOR.   
 
6 Empirical Model  
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Figure 1: Trends in Policy Rates
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
J
u
l-
0
1
D
e
c
-0
1
M
a
y
-0
2
O
c
t-
0
2
M
a
r-
0
3
A
u
g
-0
3
J
a
n
-0
4
J
u
n
-0
4
N
o
v
-0
4
A
p
r-
0
5
S
e
p
-0
5
F
e
b
-0
6
J
u
l-
0
6
D
e
c
-0
6
M
a
y
-0
7
O
c
t-
0
7
M
a
r-
0
8
A
u
g
-0
8
J
a
n
-0
9
J
u
n
-0
9
N
o
v
-0
9
A
p
r-
1
0
S
e
p
-1
0
F
e
b
-1
1
J
u
l-
1
1
p
e
rc
e
n
t
Spread 1(WALRM-PR) Spread 2 (WALRM-TBCO)
Figure  2: Spread Between  Lending and Policy Rates
One of the most important techniques for analyzing the dynamics of interest rate pass-through is the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) model (Pesaran et al 2001).  This technique has advantage over other specifications including 
unrestricted Vector Error Correction, Structural Vector Auto-regression, and other single equation approaches to co-
integration.  This technique also allows the estimation of short and long run relationships even if the underlying 
variables are not integrated of the same order, and the sample is small.   
 
Following Pesaran et al (2001), a conditional ARDL error correction specification of order (1,1) to measure the impact 
of money market rate (MMR) upon marginal lending rate (as an example) is as follow:  
 
∆𝐿𝑅𝑀𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑅𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆𝐿𝑅𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽5∆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽5∆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑡−1 + µ𝑡   
 
Where LRMt is the weighted average lending rate, MMRt is the money rate, Δ stand for difference, and µt is an error 
term.  In estimation, structural lags in above specification are established by using information criteria like Akaike‟s 
Informational Criterion (AIC), Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and other diagnostics of the residuals.   
 
Once the optimal lag structure is identified, the specification is tested for the existence of the long run relationship (i.e., 
co-integration) by using “bounds test”.  Specifically, the Wald test is used to test for the long run relationship by 
imposing restrictions on above specification.  The above specification implies that following hypothesis will be a test for 
co-integration.  
Null Hypothesis:  𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 0, i.e., there is no long run relationship.   
Alternative Hypothesis:  𝐻1: 𝛽1 ≠ 𝛽2 ≠ 0 , i.e., there is a long run relationship.   
Restrictions under Null Hypothesis are evaluated by computing F-Statistic and using critical values for Lower and 
Upper bounds provided by Pesaran et al (2001).  
In case of evidence in favour of co-integration, the ARDL specification can be used to obtain conditional long run 
model by as assuming that all deviations (difference terms) are equal to zero.   
𝐿𝑅𝑀𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑡  
Simple algebra also indicates that long run coefficient can easily be estimated from the conditional ARDL-ECM 
estimated earlier.   
 
7 Results  
A good starting point for estimation is to explore time series properties of interest rates.  We use Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test to explore the presence of unit root in the series.  The test statistics for each series reported in Table 
3 shows that all the interest rate series exhibit a unit root process and are integrated of order 1. Time series properties, 
of the series of interest we have, allow the estimation of conditional ARDL-ECM, as it requires that dependent variable 
should be integrated of order 1 for testing the existence of long run relationship, while there is no restriction on the 
order of integration of the regressors  (i.e., explanatory variables) to be necessarily I(1).   
 
Table 3: Results of ADF Unit Root Test 
 Level  1
st
 Difference 
Variable ADF Intercept Trend Lags  ADF Intercept Trend Lags 
TBCO -0.5979 Yes No One  -8.3255 Yes No Zero 
  
 
 
7.1 Pass-through of Policy Rates to Money Market Rates (KIBOR) 
To estimate the degree of pass-through from policy rates to money market rates, we take into account all the possible 
combination of three different proxies of policy rates and four different tenors of money market rates (i.e., one-week, 1-
month, 3-month, and 6-month KIBOR).   
 
Based on Schwartz-Bayesian Criterion (SBC), LM test for the presence of serial correlation it was found that ARDL 
(1,1) model is the best fit in most of the cases.  Although presence of serial correlation in few regressions undermines 
the efficiency of OLS estimators, we consider it as a cost of maintaining comparability across regressions.  Therefore, 
the specification is kept unchanged at order (1, 1) in all regressions in a bid to preserve comparability across the 
regressions.     
 
We test for the existence of long run 
relationship by using „bounds tests‟.  
The results of Wald-tests reported in 
Table 4 indicate that long run 
relationship exists between T-bill 
rates and all tenors of money market 
as all values of F-statistic are 
considerably greater than the asymptotic critical value of upper bound.  The same is also the case for long run 
relationship between overnight rate and the KIBOR.  However, there is no evidence of cointegration between the SBP 
policy rate and money market rate over the period of estimation.  This apparently surprising result is understandable 
given the infrequent changes in policy rate due to its administered nature, and incorporating the period of July 2003 to 
July 2005 (see section 5.3) in the estimation process.  The parameters of unrestricted ARDL models are used to 
calculate the degree of pass-through (for both the short run and the long run) and the approximate time required to 
reach the long run equilibrium (Table 5) by using techniques specified in section 6.   
 
 Diagnostic of unrestricted ARDL model reveals that 6-month T-bills cut-off rates is an important component of the 
monetary transmission mechanism over the period of estimation.  It has swift pass-through to all tenors of money 
market rates and the long run degree of pass-through is close to one.  The results also indicate that it takes less 
ONIR -1.7695 Yes No Zero  -9.9260 Yes No One 
ONR -2.6770 Yes No Zero  -14.1110 Yes No Zero 
LRO -2.4459 Yes No One  -2.5847 Yes No Zero 
LRM -1.9275 Yes No Four  -3.0530 Yes No Three 
DRO -1.7839 Yes No One  -6.0499 Yes No Zero 
DRM -0.6636 Yes No Zero  -12.7272 Yes No Zero 
K1W -1.2620 Yes No Zero  -5.3075 Yes No Three 
K1M -0.5900 Yes No One  -8.4796 Yes No Zero 
K3M -0.8111 Yes No One  -7.1499 Yes No Zero 
K6M -0.8836 Yes No One  -6.8353 Yes No Zero 
Critical values at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance are 3.4865, 2.8861 and 2.5799 respectively.   
Table 4: F-Statistics for Testing Long Run Relationship 
  F-Statistic 
  T-bills Rates Overnight Rate Policy Rate 
KIBOR 1-week 12.50* 7.84* 1.80 
KIBOR 1-month 8.81* 6.33* 1.11 
KIBOR 3-month 6.50* 5.51** 1.07 
KIBOR 6-month 5.91* 5.11** 1.08 
Note: Asymptomatic Critical values at 1% 4.29, 5.61 and 5% are 3.23 and 4.35 
* indicates significant at 1 percent, while ** indicate significant at 5 percent.    
than two months to reach the degree of long run pass-through for money market rates of all tenors.  Specifically, a 
100 bps change in T-bills cut-off rates has an immediate impact (during a month) of 74 to 82 bps on money market 
rates (1-month to 6-month KIBOR).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Compared to T-bill cut-off rate, the 
impact of changes in weighted 
average overnight rates is largely 
confined to lower end of the yield 
curve (i.e., up to one week KIBOR).  
Specifically, a 100 bps change in 
overnight rate will have 61 bps 
changes in one week KIBOR during 
a month (see Table 5).  The same 
change in overnight rate has 
negligible impact on 3 and 6 months 
KIBOR rates.  In other words, pass-through of overnight rate to money market rates of one month and over is not 
only sluggish, but incomplete also.   
 
7.2 Pass-through of Money Market Rates to Retail Bank Rates 
Now we explore the impact of changes in money market rates on retail bank rates (both lending and deposit rates).  
Estimation of unrestricted ARDL models and related diagnostics indicate that models are well specified in most of the 
cases (few regressions which suffered from the problem of serial correlation are re-estimated by increasing the lag 
length of the model).   
 
The estimation of conditional ARDL-ECM is followed by the bounds tests for exploring the possibility of long run 
relationship between the retail rates of the banking system and the money market rates of different tenors.  Test 
statistics indicate the co-movement of retail banks and money market rates over the period of estimation (see Table 6).   
Table 5: Pass-through of Policy Rates to Money Market Rates 
  Short Run Long Run 
Approximate 
Time (months) 
Pass-through of 6-m T-bills Cut Off Rate to KIBOR  
One Week 0.736 0.938 1.275 
One Month 0.816 0.992 1.216 
Three Months 0.828 0.961 1.161 
Six Months 0.804 0.931 1.158 
Pass-through Overnight rate to Market Rates  
One Week 0.609 0.914 1.499 
One Month 0.146 0.754 5.175 
Three Months 0.014 0.576 42.015 
Six Months 0.009 0.516 55.346 
Table 6: F-Statistics for Testing Long Run Relationship 
  F-Statistic  (KIBOR) 
  1-week 1-month 3-month 6-month 
Lending rate Marginal 9.98* 7.21* 9.20* 9.98* 
Lending Rate-outstanding 6.65* 8.14* 11.90* 10.75* 
Deposit rate-marginal 10.12* 8.62* 9.29* 9.17* 
Deposit rate-Outstanding 4.11*** 8.75* 14.40* 14.95* 
 These results indicate that 
following points are worth noting.   
1) The pass-through of money market rates to weighted average lending rate (on fresh loans) is approximately 
close to one (see Table 7).  Specifically, a 100 bps change in 6-month KIBOR will lead to 96 bps change in 
lending rates in the long run.  Almost half of this pass-through is completed during first month of the change.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) Compared to 
responsiveness of the 
lending rate on fresh 
loans, pass-through of 
money market rates to 
lending rate on 
outstanding is not only 
sluggish, but also 
incomplete.  Specifically, 
a 100 bps change in 3-
month KIBOR has an 
immediate (during a 
month) impact of 10 bps 
on the weighted average 
lending rates on 
outstanding loans.  Its 
long run impact turns out 
to be only 29 bps, which 
is nowhere close to the 
change of 100 bps.   
3) Pass-through from money markets to deposit rates is also sluggish and incomplete.  Within different money 
market rates, the results indicate that returns on fresh deposits are relatively more responsive to changes in 
KIBOR of 1 to 6-month tenors.  The long run impact is hovering around 60 bps, while the immediate response 
is in the range of 13 to 29 bps.   
 
7.3 Possibility of Asymmetric Impact 
It is generally perceived that Pakistani banks follow different time paths for adjusting their lending and deposit rates in 
response to increasing and decreasing interest rate scenarios.  To explore this possibility over the study period, we 
Note: Asymptomatic Critical values at 1% 4.29, 5.61 and 5% are 3.23 and 4.35  
 * indicates significant at 1 percent, ** indicate significant at 5 percent, *** indicate 
significant at 10 percent.   
Table 7: Pass-through of Money market Rates to Banks' Retail Rates 
  Short Run Long Run 
Approximate 
Time 
Pass-through of 1-week KIBOR 
   Lending Rates-Marginal 0.30 0.91 3.08 
Lending rates-Outstanding 0.05 0.25 5.46 
Deposit rates-Fresh 0.13 0.64 5.06 
Deposit rates-Outstanding 0.04 0.60 15.07 
Pass-through of 1-month KIBOR 
   Lending Rates-Marginal 0.38 0.91 2.39 
Lending rates-Outstanding 0.09 0.27 3.14 
Deposit rates-Fresh 0.22 0.60 2.72 
Deposit rates-Outstanding 0.12 0.65 5.53 
Pass-through of 3-month KIBOR 
   Lending Rates-Marginal 0.38 0.92 2.39 
Lending rates-Outstanding 0.10 0.29 2.80 
Deposit rates-Fresh 0.27 0.60 2.24 
Deposit rates-Outstanding 0.14 0.68 4.85 
Pass-through of 6-month KIBOR 
   Lending Rates-Marginal 0.44 0.96 2.18 
Lending rates-Outstanding 0.10 0.34 3.50 
Deposit rates-Fresh 0.29 0.61 2.13 
Deposit rates-Outstanding 0.15 0.71 4.80 
followed the methodology of Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Borio and Fritz (1995) and Mojon (2000).  Specifically, 
overall sample period is divided into two sub-samples: (1) policy rate is flat or increasing; and (2) policy rate is flat or 
decreasing.   
 
To quantify these 
differences, we run 
separate unrestricted 
ARDL models based 
on two subsamples.  
For the sake of brevity, 
we confined our 
analysis to impact of 3-
month KIBOR on both the marginal lending and deposit rates.  The results confirm our expectation that adjustment in 
both lending and deposit rates adjust differently when market interest rates are increasing or decreasing (see Table 8). 
Specifically, in a decreasing interest rate scenario, the pass-through to lending rate is greater than in case of 
decreasing interest rate scenario.  This is contrary to the popular perception at least on face value.  However, these 
are understandable if seen in the context of banks‟ overall loan portfolio.  First, the corporate sector is the biggest 
borrower, which generally has the power to bargain with the banking system.  Second, major portion of private sector 
loans is for the working capital.  Here again, the corporate sector has the opportunity to repay their working capital and 
re-negotiate on new terms.  Finally, the relatively greater competition among banks for extending loans (especially to 
the corporate sector) plays its role in setting their lending rate differently in case of increasing or decreasing interest 
rate scenario.   
 
8 Conclusion 
This study investigates the impact of changes in State Bank of Pakistan‟s policy rate on money market and retails 
rates of the banking system. We use monthly time series data on key interest rates from July 2001 to August 2011, to 
estimate unrestricted auto-regressive error correction model (ARDL-ECM).  To explore dynamics of different interest 
rates, SBP monetary policy rate, T-bill cut-off rates and weighted average overnight rate are used proxies for the policy 
rates.  Among the money market rate, KIBOR of different tenors is used as the pass-through from very short term 
money market rates (1-Week or 1-month KIBOR) can differ from that of 3 to 6 - month KIBOR on the retail rates of 
banks.  Similarly, we used two type of lending and deposit rates each (outstanding as well as fresh).   
For estimation, we use two-stage procedure to analyze dynamics among the interest rates. At first stage, we explore 
the pass-through of changes in policy rates to money market rates.  The results indicate cut-off rate of T-bills emerged 
as the most important link in transmitting changes in policy rate to money market rates.  Specifically, a long run 
equilibrium relationship exists between T-bills cut-off rate and KIBOR of all tenors.  The long run impact is one-to-one 
and a 100 bps change in policy rate has an immediate (during a month) impact of around 80 bps on KIBOR of all 
tenors.  It implies that full impact is realized in less than two months period.   
In the second stage, we explored pass-through of changes in money market rates to banks‟ lending and deposit rates.  
The results indicate that lending rates on fresh loans are more responsive to changes in money market rates 
compared to the lending rates on outstanding loans.  Specifically, a 100 bps change in KIBOR of different tenor leads 
Table 8: Asymmetric Pass-through of Money Market Rates to Banks' Retail Rates 
  Short Run Long Run 
Approximate 
Time 
Pass-through of 3-month KIBOR to Lending Rate 
  Marginal (Flat or decreasing) 0.94 1.48 1.57 
Marginal (Flat or Increasing)  0.50 0.87 1.74 
Pass-through of 3-month KIBOR to Deposit Rate 
  Marginal (Flat or decreasing) 0.71 0.59 0.84 
Marginal (Flat or increasing) 0.32 0.60 1.85 
to 91 to 96 bps change in lending rate on fresh loans. In terms of time, it takes two-to-three months to achieve full 
impact.   
Compared to lending rates, pass-through of changes in money market rates to deposit rates is not only sluggish but 
incomplete as well.  Response of returns on fresh deposits is confined to only 60 bps only due to 100 bps change in 
money market rates.  Moreover, it takes two-to six months to realize this impact.   
Finally, there is evidence in favour of asymmetric pass-through of money rates to banks‟ lending and deposit rates.  
Both lending and deposit rates follow different time paths in decreasing and increasing policy rate scenarios.  
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